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Multiterminal Secret Key Agreement with
Nearly No Discussion
Chung Chan, Manuj Mukherjee, Praneeth Kumar Vippathalla, and Qiaoqiao Zhou
Abstract
We consider the secret key agreement problem under the multiterminal source model proposed by Csisza´r and
Narayan. A single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity is desired but remains unknown except in the extreme
case with unlimited public discussion and without wiretapper’s side information. Taking the problem to the opposite
extreme by requiring the public discussion rate to be zero asymptotically, we obtain the desired characterization
under surprisingly general setting with wiretapper’s side information, silent users, trusted and untrusted helpers. An
immediate consequence of the result is that the capacity with nearly no discussion is the same as the capacity with
no discussion, resolving a previous conjecture in the affirmative. The idea of the proof is to characterize the capacity
in the special case with neither wiretapper’s side information nor untrusted helpers using a multivariate extension
of Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information, and then extend the result to the general setting by a change of scenario that
turns untrusted helpers into trusted helpers. We further show how to evaluate the capacity explicitly for finite linear
sources and discuss how the current result can be extended to improve and unify existing bounds on the capacity for
strictly positive discussion rates.
Index Terms
Multiterminal secret key agreement; Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information; secrecy capacity; double Markov in-
equality; general source model; finite linear source.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key agreement between two users was formulated close to thirty years ago in [2, 3],
following a counter-intuitive result pointed out in [4] that two users can extract a longer secret key from their
private observations by discussing in public. In particular, under the basic source model where two users observe
i.i.d. sequences of the private correlated random sources, say X and Y, respectively, the maximum secret key rate,
referred to as the secrecy capacity, is equal to the mutual information I(X∧Y) between the correlated sources. If the
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2users cannot discuss in public, the problem reduces to the one considered in [5], where the capacity is the entropy
of the maximal common function of the correlated sources, referred to as the Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information
JGK(X ∧ Y). It should be mentioned that a more general setting considers a wiretapper with side information, say
Z, in addition to listening to the entire public discussion, but there is hitherto no single-letter characterization of
the capacity except in the special case when the discussion is one-way [3, Theorem 1]. Nevertheless, extensions of
the model beyond the two-user case are of practical and theoretical interests because, as can been seen from the
results in [1, 6, 7], the problem calls for multivariate extensions of various well-known information measures in
the bivariate case, including Shannon’s mutual information, Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information and Wyner common
information [8].
The simplest extension of secret key agreement beyond two users is by [9], which, in addition to the two active
users who attempt to share a secret key, introduces a helper who can help discuss in public but need not share the
secret key. The general multiterminal setting was subsequently formulated in [10], allowing arbitrary numbers of
active users and helpers. There are also untrusted helpers whose observations may be leaked to the wiretapper. In
the case without wiretapper’s side information, and when the public discussion is interactive and unlimited in rate,
the secrecy capacity has a single-letter characterization in [10]. The capacity was studied and proposed in [6, 11] as
an extension of Shannon’s mutual information to the multivariate case, with application to data clustering in [12]. A
theoretically appealing characterization using the residual independence relation can be found in [6, Theorem 5.1].
The model in [13] considers a new scenario where a proper subset of active users are silent, i.e., not allowed to
discuss in public, but the model does not have helpers. Similar to [9], the capacity was characterized [13] in the
case with unlimited public discussion and without wiretapper’s side information. For the setting with helpers in
addition to silent active users, the capacity is characterized in [14, Theorem 5.1] (the longer version of [7]). Once
again, no characterization is known for the case with wiretapper’s side information. Even the case with two users
remains unsolved beyond one-way discussion.
Another challenge is to characterize the capacity as a function of the public discussion rates. For the two-user
case with one-way discussion, the capacity was characterized in [9, Theorem 2.6], extending the result in [3] for
unlimited one-way discussion. A more explicit characterization was also derived for Gaussian sources in [15, 16].
When the discussion is asymptotically zero, the capacity reduces to the Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information in the
two user case, which can be achieved with no discussion. The characterization also applies to the two-user case with
interactive discussion as a consequence of the more general characterization of the capacity in [17] as a function
of the public discussion rates. For the multiterminal case without helpers nor silent users, it was conjectured in
[1] that the capacity is equal to a multivariate extension of the Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information, which can be
achieved again without any discussion. However, the conjecture remains open except for the special finite linear
source models [1].
In this work, we aim to resolve the conjecture and characterize the secrecy capacity for the general source model
with interactive discussion at asymptotically zero discussion rate in the presence of wiretapper’s side information,
helpers and silent users. The problem covers the case when no discussion is allowed, i.e., when all users are silent.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing models or results directly cover the problem in such generality. In
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3particular, the model in [13] and [14] do not cover the case where all users are silent as the proof technique relies
on having at least one user with unbounded discussion rate. There is also no obvious multiterminal extension of the
capacity characterizations in the case of two active users [3, 9, 17], especially the converse proofs that rely on the
Csisza´r-sum identity. Furthermore, the characterization [17] for interactive discussion does not involve wiretapper’s
side information. The characterization in [17] is based on the idea of [18] that uses the interactive source coding
result of [19]. The characterization is hard to evaluate as it involves a large number of auxiliary random variables
that grows in the number of rounds of interactive discussion, which may go unbounded. There are other bounding
techniques for the multiterminal secrecy capacity such as the lamination bound in [20, Theorem 4.3][21] and
the helper-set bound in [20, Theorem 4.1]. However, lamination does not extend beyond hypergraphical sources,
while the helper-set bound was shown to be loose for a simple example in [20, Fig. 2] at asymptotically zero
discussion rate. Despite all these challenges, we found that the capacity at asymptotically zero discussion has a
simple characterization and resolved the previous conjecture in the affirmative as a special case.
The paper is organized as follows: We will formulate the problem in Section II, and give the main results in
Section III followed by some discussion of the results in Section IV and their proofs in the Appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We shall consider the multiterminal source model for secret key generation introduced in [10], which is specified
by a finite set V of |V | ≥ 2 users and a discrete memoryless multiple source
ZV := (Zi | i ∈ V )
taking values in the finite alphabet ZV :=
∏
i∈V Zi, and distributed jointly according to PZV . We remark here that
we will be using the sans serif font for random variables and the normal font for their alphabet sets. The secret
key agreement can be broken into a sequence of phases as follows.
In the private observation phase, each user i ∈ V observes n i.i.d. samples Zni := (Zi1, . . . ,Zin) of the ith
component source Zi. In the private randomization phase, user i ∈ V can generate a private random variable Ui
independent of the private sources ZnV . Altogether
PZn
V
UV = P
n
ZV
∏
i∈V
PUi , (1)
where UV = (Ui | i ∈ V ).1 To agree upon a secret key, all users except for a subset S ⊆ V of silent users are
allowed to communicate interactively over a public noiseless channel during the public communication phase. This
implies that the communication sent by some user i may depend on its accumulated observations. More precisely,
at the t-th instant where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} for some chosen integer r, some vocal user it ∈ V broadcasts a message
F˜t as a function of the previous messages F˜
t−1 := (F˜τ | τ ≤ t) and the private observation (Znit ,Uit) of the user
it, i.e.,
H(F˜t|F˜
t−1,Znit ,Uit) = 0.
1The private randomization variables may be continuous.
April 26, 2019
4For convenience, we denote the entire sequence of public messages by
F := (F˜1, F˜2, . . . , F˜r).
The rate of the public communication is given by lim supn→∞
1
n
log |F |, where F is the range of F.
Following the public communication, a predetermined subset A ⊆ V of |A| ≥ 2 users need to agree upon a
secret key K taking values in the set K . We also assume that another predetermined subset D ⊆ V , D∩A = ∅, of
users are being tapped by the wiretapper. The set A is referred to as the set of active users, the set D is called the
set of untrusted helpers, whereas the users in V \ (A∪D) will be referred to as the trusted helpers. We remark that
each user in A must be able to recover K from its accumulated observations. On the other hand, any wiretapper
listening to the public communication and having access to the untrusted helpers’ observation, should be oblivious
to K. In other words, we want K to be ‘almost independent’ of (F,ZnD). More precisely, we need K to satisfy the
following recoverability and secrecy constraints: There exists some functions φi, for i ∈ V , such that
lim
n→∞
Pr {∃i ∈ A,K 6= φi(F,Z
n
i ,Ui)} = 0 (recoverability)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
[log|K| −H(K|F,ZnD,UD)] = 0. (secrecy)
(2a)
(2b)
The rate of the secret key K is defined to be lim infn→∞
1
n
log |K|. We define the secrecy capacity with a total
communication rate R ≥ 0 by
CS(R) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|F | ≤ R.
(3a)
(3b)
We are interested in characterizing CS(0), namely, the secrecy capacity with asymptotically zero discussion rate. It
is important to point out that our formulation covers the model with wiretapper’s side information by the sources
ZS∩D of the silent untrusted helpers. This is because having a wiretapper observe some side information Z directly is
equivalent to having the wiretapper observe it through the source of a silent untrusted helper. Since a silent untrusted
user cannot discuss, its knowledge of the side information cannot affect the secrecy capacity. The formulation also
cover the case with no discussion by allowing S to be the entire set V , unlike [13, 14] which require the S to be
a proper subset of A.
We should remark here that the secrecy constraint appearing in (2b) is referred to as weak secrecy in the literature.
Several works including [10] study a stronger secrecy criteria, referred to as strong secrecy, obtained by removing
the 1
n
term from (2b). Our results are valid for both the weak secrecy and the strong secrecy criteria. We choose
to define secrecy using the weak secrecy criteria since the main bottleneck in our proof is the converse part, i.e.,
obtaining an upper bound on CS(0). Noting that a key satisfying strong secrecy will by default satisfy weak secrecy,
an upper bound on CS(0) defined using weak secrecy will therefore automatically translate to an upper bound on
CS(0) defined using strong secrecy.
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5III. MAIN RESULTS
The main result is the following single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity at asymptotically zero
discussion rate, in the presence of active users A, trusted helpers (V \A) \D, untrusted helpers D and silent users
S:
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity at asymptotically zero discussion rate is
CS(0) = H(G|ZD), (4)
where G is a solution to
JGK(ZA) := max{H(G) | H(G|Zi) = 0, ∀i ∈ A}. (5)
Furthermore, the capacity can be achieved with no discussion. ✷
Note that the capacity does not depend on S, i.e., the capacity remains unchanged whether a user is silent or
not. This is consistent with the fact that the capacity can be achieved without discussion. Furthermore, notice that
the capacity does not depend on the sources Z(V \A)\D of the trusted helpers because the solution G to (5) depends
only on the sources ZA of the active users. In other words, the capacity remains unchanged even if the trusted
helpers were removed, i.e., with V reassigned as A ∪ D. This is expected because, according to the secret key
agreement protocol, helpers need not share the secret key but may help improve the secrecy capacity via public
discussion. However, the fact that the capacity can be achieved with no discussion means that the trusted helpers
cannot improve the capacity by discussion. Similarly, untrusted helpers cannot increase the capacity by discussion
but their presence may diminish the capacity because the capacity H(G|ZD) with untrusted helpers is no larger
than the capacity H(G) without untrusted helpers. This is again expected because the sources ZD of the untrusted
helpers are leaked to the wiretapper, and so the common randomness between G and ZD cannot be used for the
secret key.
JGK(ZA) in (5) is a multivariate extension of the Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information first introduced by Ga´cs and
Ko¨rner in [5] for the case of two users. The optimal G is unique up to bijections and referred to as the maximal
common function (m.c.f.) of Zi for i ∈ A. The fact G is called a common function is because the constraint
H(G|Zi) = 0 in (5) implies G = gi(Zi) for some function gi. It is called maximal because, if there exists another
common function G′ that is not a function of G, i.e., H(G′|G) > 0, then H(G′,G) > H(G), leading to the
contradiction that (G′,G) is a strictly better solution to (5). Once again, the fact that the capacity can be achieved
with no discussion is consistent with its characterization via the maximal common function that every active user
can compute from their source without discussion. We remark that, while it is obvious the characterization of the
capacity is achievable with no discussion, proving that the characterization is the best achievable rate is non-trivial,
especially when public discussion, albeit of zero rate, is allowed. We will give the proof of the main result in
Appendix A, and an alternative proof for the case with no discussion in Appendix C to explain the non-triviality
involved in handling the case with public discussion.
While a single-letter characterization is widely accepted as a computable solution in Information Theory, the
computation is often very difficult due to optimization over auxiliary random variables such as the maximal common
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6function G in our case. For the characterization to be useful, it is important to be able to compute it efficiently.
Fortunately, there does exist a systematic method called the ergodic decomposition to compute the Ga´c–Ko¨rner
common information [5], and such a method can be directly extended to the multivariate case using an inductive
argument, similar to the inductive proofs in the appendix. However, the computation is exponential in the number
of random variables, and it is hard to give an explicit expression for the Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information for large
networks. For the remainder of this section, we introduce a broad class of correlated random sources, called the
finite linear source model, and give a polynomial-time computable expression for the maximal common function
and therefore the secrecy capacity.
Definition 1 ([22]) A source ZV is said to be a finite linear source if its component can be written up to bijections
2
as
Zi = xM i ∀i ∈ V, (6)
where x is a uniform random vector with elements taking values from some finite field Fq , and M i is a deterministic
matrix with elements from Fq . ✷
Theorem 2 For finite linear sources, the solution to (5), i.e., the m.c.f. of Zi for i ∈ A, is given by
G = xM , (7)
where M is a matrix whose column space is
〈M〉 =
⋂
i∈A
〈M i〉, (8)
namely the intersection of the column spaces of all M i for i ∈ A. 〈M〉 is also the maximum common subspace
equal to argmaxS{dimS | S ⊆ 〈Mi〉 ∀i ∈ A}.
Therefore, the Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information is given by
JGK(ZA) = rank(M) log q, (9)
namely the dimension of the maximum common subspace in log q bits. ✷
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B. In the presence of untrusted helpers, the secrecy capacity in (4)
is simply
H(G|ZD) = H(G,ZD)−H(ZD)
= log q [rank([M MD ])− rank(MD)] ,
where M is a matrix whose column space satisfies (8). We conclude this section by giving an example of a finite
linear source and computing its Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information.
2Two random variables Z and Z′ are said to be bijections of each other iff H(Z|Z′) = H(Z′|Z) = 0.
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7Example 1 Let Xa, Xb, and Xc be uniformly random and independent bits. Consider A = V = {1, 2} (D = ∅),
and set
Z1 := (Xa,Xb,Xa ⊕ Xb)
Z2 := (Xc,Xa ⊕ Xb ⊕ Xc).
This is a finite linear source because, with x := [ Xa,Xb,Xc ],
Z1 = x
M1:=︷ ︸︸ ︷

1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 0

, Z2 = x
M2:=︷ ︸︸ ︷

0 1
0 1
1 1

,
and x is uniformly distributed over F22. Note also that CS(0) = JGK(ZA) by (4).
Before computing G in (7), notice that M1 does not have full column rank because the last column is the sum
of the first two. We may remove the last column and consider instead
Z1 = x
M1:=︷ ︸︸ ︷

1 0
0 1
0 0

 and Z2 = x
M2:=︷ ︸︸ ︷

0 1
0 1
1 1

 .
To compute 〈M1〉∩〈M2〉, note that the null space of [M1 M2 ] =
[
1 0
0 1
0 0
∣∣∣ 0 10 1
1 1
]
is spanned by

u
v

 with u = v = [ 11 ].
Therefore, the matrix
M := M1u = −M2v =
[
1 1 0
]⊺
(10)
spans the desired intersection 〈M 1〉∩〈M2〉. Hence, G = xM = Xa⊕Xb. Hence, by (9), we have JGK(ZA) = 1.✷
IV. DISCUSSION
The primary goal of multiterminal secret key agreement is to understand how users should discuss to share a
secret key not known to a wiretapper. By characterizing the secrecy capacity as a function of the public discussion
rates of individual users, we gained valuable insights of the theoretical limits and the achieving schemes. The
characterization of upper and lower bounds also inspired meaningful information measures and their properties
applicable to other related problems. Despite the challenges of characterizing the capacity in the two-user case
under the basic source model, we obtained a simple and meaningful characterization by requiring the discussion
rate to go to zero asymptotically. The characterization is a result of a better understanding of the Ga´cs–Ko¨rner
common information and its appropriate multivariate extension.
In contrast to the result [4] that public discussion improves the secret key rate, our work conveys the opposite
message that one cannot improve the secret key rate by public discussion at asymptotically zero discussion rate.
Despite such a negative result, our work demonstrates how one can characterize the secrecy capacity in the
multiterminal case with public discussion at limited rate. While this work focuses on asymptotically zero discussion
rate, the proof techniques can be extended to the case with strictly positive discussion rate. There are various existing
bounds on the secret capacity for positive discussion rate but they have obvious limitations. For the multiterminal
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8setting, the best upper bounds are the helper-set bound and lamination bounds in [20, 21]. While the helper-set
bound is tight for a special class of pairwise independent networks (PIN) [20, Theorem 4.2], it is loose for a simple
PIN [20, Fig. 2] at zero discussion rate. Our result is expected to improve the helper-set bound strictly because it
characterizes the capacity at zero discussion rate. Even though the basic lamination bound [20, Theorem 4.3] is
already tight for the general PIN model [20, Theorem 4.4], the lamination bound makes use of seemingly different
techniques [21, Lemma A.1] that do not apply beyond hypergraphical sources, even to finite linear sources. Our
result is expected to improve the helper-set bound for general sources. It may potentially lead to a unified bound that
covers the lamination bound for hypergraphical sources and also the lower bound for communication complexity
in [7] via the Wyner common information.
It difficult to extend our result to give a single-letter characterization for positive discussion rates as the two-user
case remains unsolved [17]. However, we believe it is possible to resolve the conjecture in [23] that the decremental
secret key agreement scheme in [24] achieves the capacity for hypergraphical sources. In particular, the resulting
characterization of the communication complexity may be viewed as an asymptotic counter-part of that of [25]
for non-asymptotic hypergraphical sources, but without the assumption that the discussion is linear. Note that the
decremental secret key agreement scheme can be extended to the compressed secret key agreement scheme in [26].
Therefore, a more general result applicable beyond hypergraphical sources would be an optimality condition for
compressed secret key agreement that can be satisfied for any hypergraphical sources using decremental secret key
agreement. We remark that the capacity was characterized for the PIN model [20, Theorem 4.4] only in the case
without helpers, as the achieving scheme uses the tree-packing protocol [27], which is not optimal in the case with
helpers. Hence, a less ambitious goal is to characterize the capacity for the PIN model with helpers.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we derive the characterization (4) of the secrecy capacity at asymptotically zero discussion rate
and show that the capacity can be achieved with neither discussion nor private randomization. We first show the
achievability, i.e., one can choose the secret key at rate H(G|ZD) with no public discussion while satisfying the
recoverability and secrecy constraints in (2). By the balanced coloring Lemma [10, Lemma B.3]3, there exists a
choice of K satisfying the conditions
lim
n→∞
log|K| −H(K|ZnD) = 0
lim
n→∞
1
n
log|K| −H(G|ZD) = 0.
The first equality implies the secrecy constraint (2b) while the recoverability constraint (2a) follows from the fact
that G is a common function computable by the active users with no discussion. The last equality implies that the
secret key rate is H(G|ZD) as desired. This completes the proof of achievability.
For the converse proof, it suffices to consider the case without silent users, i.e., S = ∅, because the bound for this
case also applies to the case with silent users. Compared to the proof of achievability, the converse proof is more
3We set U, V, and g in [10, Lemma B.3] to G, ZD and a constant function respectively.
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9complicated and will be broken into two steps: We first prove for the case without untrusted helpers that CS(0) ≤
JGK(ZA); Then, we consider the case with untrusted users and extend the result to prove CS(0) ≤ H(G|ZD) in
(4). More precisely, to make use of the result for the case without untrusted helpers, we will consider a change of
scenario that turns untrusted helpers into trusted helpers. Roughly speaking, if K is a feasible secret key for the
original scenario with untrusted helpers, it is also a feasible secret key for the modified scenario. Since the key rate
for the modified scenario with no untrusted helper is upper bounded by Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information, we can
argue that 1
n
H(K|Gn) goes to 0, i.e., the randomness in K is primarily from that of the m.c.f. G. This will imply
the desired capacity upper bound H(G|ZD) for the original scenario with untrusted helpers because the randomness
in ZD cannot be used for the secret key.
We remark that our approach is different from the converse proof in [9] that handles the wiretapper’s side
information, or equivalently, the source of silent untrusted helpers by the Csisza´r-sum identity. It appears that the
technique using Csisza´r-sum identity is limiting and does not extend to the multiterminal setting involving more
than two active users.
A. Proof of converse without untrusted helpers
The converse proof for the case with untrusted helpers follows a similar single-letterization technique as in [9]
and uses the following property of the m.c.f.:
Lemma A1 For A ⊆ B ⊆ V , the Markov conditions
I(Q ∧ ZB|Zi) = 0 ∀i ∈ A (A1)
imply the Markov condition
I(Q ∧ ZB|G) = 0, (A2)
where G is the m.c.f. of Zi for i ∈ A. ✷
The Lemma can be viewed as a multivariate extension of the double Markov inequality [28, Problem 16.25], which
is the special case when |A| = 2 and A = V .
PROOF The Markov conditions (A1) means that Q and ZB are independent given Zi for all i ∈ A, i.e.,
PQ|Zi(q|zi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
(q)
i (zi):=
= PQ|ZB(q|zB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(q)(zB):=
∀q ∈ Q, zB ∈ ZB : PZB (zB) > 0.
It follows that
f
(q)
i (Zi) = f
(q)(ZB) ∀i ∈ A, q ∈ Q.
Note that f
(q)
i (Zi) on the left is possibly random because Zi is. The above condition means that f
(q)(ZB) is a
common function of Zi for i ∈ A, and so it must be a function of the maximal common function G by [5]. (See
also the explanation below (5).) Hence,
f (q)(ZB) = PQ|G,ZB (q|G,ZB) = PQ|G(q|G) ∀q ∈ Q,
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which implies the desired Markov condition (A2). The first equality is because G is a function of ZB . The last
equality is because f
(q)
i (Zi) is a function of G. 
For the desired converse proof, we will apply the above Lemma with A = B. More precisely, we will show that
CS(0) ≤ sup{I(Q ∧ ZA) | I(Q ∧ ZA) = I(Q ∧ Zi), ∀i ∈ A}, (A3)
where the maximization is over all possible PQ|ZA . Applying Lemma A1 with B = A, the constraint in (A3) implies
(A1) and so I(Q ∧ ZA|G) = 0 by (A2). By the data processing inequality,
I(Q ∧ ZA) ≤ I(G ∧ ZA) = H(G)
and so (A3) implies the desired bound CS(0) ≤ H(G) = JGK(ZA).
It remains to prove (A3). Let J be uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} and independent of everything else,
namely (ZnV ,UV ,K,F). Define
QJ := (K,F,UA,Z
J−1
A , J).
By the secrecy constraint (2b), we have
log|K| ≤ H(K|F) + nδn
= H(K,F)−H(F) + nδn
= I(K,F ∧ ZnA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
+H(K,F|ZnA)−H(F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
+nδn,
where we use δn to denote a sufficiently large non-negative real number going to 0 sufficiently slow as n → ∞.
Next, we will bound 1, and 2, as follows: On one hand,
1,≤ I(K,F,UA ∧ Z
n
A)
=
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,UA ∧ ZAj |Z
j−1
A )
=
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,UA,Z
j−1
A ∧ ZAj)
= nI(QJ ∧ ZAJ)
where the second equality is because I(Zj−1A ∧ ZAj) = 0, for all j ∈ n, by the memorylessness (1) of the source.
On the other hand, assuming 1, 2 ∈ A without the loss of generality,
2,
(a)
≤H(K,F|ZnA,U1) +H(K,F|Z
n
A,U2)−H(F)
(b)
≤H(F|ZnA,U1) +H(F|Z
n
A,U2)−H(F) + nδn
(c)
≤H(F) + nδn
(d)
≤ 2nδn
April 26, 2019 DRAFT
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(a) follows immmediately from the lamination bound in [21, Lemma A.1] because U1, U2, and Z
n
A are mutually
independent by (1). A more detailed derivation is as follows:
H(U1|K,F,Z
n
A) ≥ H(U1|K,F,Z
n
A,U2) and so
H(K,F,ZnA,U1) +H(K,F,Z
n
A,U2) ≥ H(K,F,Z
n
A) +H(K,F,Z
n
A,U1,U2)
≥ H(K,F,ZnA) +H(Z
n
A,U1,U2)
= H(K,F,ZnA) +H(Z
n
A,U1) +H(Z
n
A,U2)−H(Z
n
A),
which, after rearrangement, leads to (a); (b) follows from the fact that
H(K|ZnA,U1,F) +H(K|Z
n
A,U2,F) ≤ nδn
by the recoverability constraint (2a); (c) is because conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (d) is by the assumption
that the discussion rate is asymptotically zero, i.e., H(F) ≤ log |F | ≤ nδn. Therefore,
1
n
log|K| ≤ I(QJ ∧ ZAJ) + 3δn. (A4)
Since the discussion rate is asymptotically zero, we have for any i ∈ A
nδn ≥ log|F | ≥ H(F|Z
n
i ,UA)
≥ H(K,F|Zni ,UA)− nδn
≥ I(K,F ∧ ZnA|Z
n
i ,UA)− nδn
= I(K,F ∧ ZnA|UA)− I(K,F ∧ Z
n
i |UA)− nδn
= I(K,F,UA ∧ Z
n
A)− I(K,F,UA ∧ Z
n
i )− nδn
=
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,UA,Z
j−1
A ∧ ZAj)−
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,UA,Z
j−1
i ∧ Zij)− nδn
≥
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,UA,Z
j−1
A ∧ ZAj)−
n∑
j=1
I(K,F,UA,Z
j−1
A ∧ Zij)− nδn
= nI(QJ ∧ ZAJ)− nI(QJ ∧ ZiJ)− nδn,
where the third inequality follows from the recoverability constraint (2a); the second equality is because I(UA ∧
ZnA) = I(UA ∧ Z
n
i ) = 0 by the assumption (1) of the private randomization; the third equality follows from the
chain rule expansion and by the memorylessness (1) of the source. Therefore,
I(QJ ∧ ZAJ)− I(QJ ∧ ZiJ) ≤ δn ∀i ∈ A. (A5)
Combining (A4) and (A5), and using the fact that PZV J = PZV , we have
CS(0) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
Γ(δn) where
Γ(δ) := sup{I(Q ∧ ZA) + δ | I(Q ∧ ZA)− I(Q ∧ Zi) ≤ δ, ∀i ∈ A} for δ ≥ 0.
The above maximization is over all possible choices of PQ|ZA . The solution exists because, using the Carathe´odory-
Fenchel-Eggleston Theorem, it can be argued that the support of Q can be bounded uniformly for all δ > 0. (See
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for example [28, Lemmas 3.4, 3.5].) Γ(δ) is also continuous in δ by the continuity of the entropy function [29] for
discrete random variables with finite alphabet sets. Hence,
lim sup
n→∞
Γ(δn) = Γ(0) = max{I(Q ∧ ZA) | I(Q ∧ ZA) = I(Q ∧ Zi), ∀i ∈ A}
which gives (A3) as desired.
We remark that the above derivation does not invoke the Csisza´r-sum identity. The auxiliary random variable Q
comes from QJ, which is obtained by simple chain-rule expansion of the i.i.d. samples of the sources. We found that
the problem of extending the single-letterization in [9] using Csisza´r-sum identity is that the Csisza´r-sum identity
involves expanding the sources in only two directions, which does not allow for a common definition of auxiliary
random variable in the case with more than two active users.
B. Proof of converse with untrusted helpers
In this section, we extend the above converse proof for the case without untrusted helpers to the case with
untrusted helpers, i.e., D 6= ∅. The proof relies on a technical Lemma [30, Lemma 3.1] similar to the proof of a
rather different result [30, Theorem 3.2] that the secret key can be chosen purely as a function of the source of any
single active user.
Consider any feasible secret key K and discussion F at asymptotically zero rate satisfying the recoverability and
secrecy constraints (2). Furthermore, assume 1 ∈ A without loss of generality and let Kˆ := φ1(F,Zn1 ,U1) be the
secret key estimate generated by user 1. It follows from the recoverability constraint (2a) and Fano’s inequality that
H(Kˆ|F,Zni ,Ui) ≤ nδn ∀i ∈ A
H(K|Kˆ) ≤ nδn.
(A6)
(A7)
Again, we use δn to denote a non-negative real number that is sufficiently large and that goes to 0 sufficiently
slowly as n goes to infinity.
Next, we modify the scenario by setting D = ∅. A, V , S, and ZV remain unchanged. Instead of using n to denote
the block length, we will use nn′ as the block length where n′ is a positive integer. To distinguish the modified
scenario from the original scenario, we will denote the secrecy capacity of the modified scenario by C′S instead of
CS. Similarly, we will use K
′ and F′ to denote the secret key and public discussion for the modified scenario. By
the converse proof in the previous section, we have
C′S(0) ≤ JGK(ZA). (A8)
We will show using the above bound that
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(K|Gn) = 0 (A9)
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and so, by the secrecy constraint (2b),
1
n
log |K| ≤
1
n
H(K|F,ZnD,UD) + δn
≤
1
n
H(K,Gn|ZnD) + δn
≤
1
n
H(Gn|ZnD) +
1
n
H(K|Gn) + δn
≤ H(G|ZD) + 2δn by (A9),
which implies CS(0) ≤ H(G|ZD), thereby establishing the desired result.
It remains to show (A9), which means that the randomness in K comes primarily from the m.c.f. G. Consider
the modified scenario with D = ∅. We first show that there exists a public discussion F′ at asymptotically zero rate
such that Kˆn
′
can be recovered by every active user asymptotically in n′, i.e.,
Pr{∃i ∈ A, Kˆn
′
6= φ′i(F
′,Znn
′
i ,U
n′
i )} ≤ δn′
for some decoding functions φ′A. In particular, we choose F
′ = (Fn
′
,F′′) where F is the discussion in the original
scenario, and F′′ is some additional discussion by user 1 at asymptotically zero rate. Existence of such F′′ follows
from [30, Lemma 3.1] by (A6).4
Note that (Kˆn
′
,Gnn
′
) is also recoverable by every active user since G is their common function. We can then
extract a secret key K′ for the modified scenario from (Kˆn
′
,Gnn
′
) at rate 1
n
H(Kˆ,Gn). More precisely, by the
balanced coloring Lemma [10, Lemma B.3], there exists a function K′ of (Kˆn
′
,Gnn
′
) satisfying
log|K ′| ≤ n′H(K′|F′) + n′δn′
log|K ′| ≥ n′H(Kˆ,Gn|F)− n′δn′ ,
where the first inequality implies the desired secrecy constraint for the modified scenario. By the last inequality
and the capacity bound (A8) for the case without untrusted helpers, we have
H(Gnn
′
) ≥ log|K ′| − nn′δnn′
≥ n′H(Kˆ,Gn|F)− n′δn′ − nn
′δnn′
We can further lower bound H(Kˆ,Gn|F) by H(Kˆ,Gn) − H(F) ≥ H(Kˆ,Gn) − nδn, where the last inequality is
because F has zero rate asymptotically in n. Rearranging the terms and letting n′ goes to infinity, we have
H(Kˆ|Gn) ≤ nδn.
By (A7), H(K|Gn) ≤ 2nδn, which implies (A9) as desired.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we shall make use of the following technical Lemma.
Lemma B1 For any finite linear (Z1,Z2), we have
I(Z1 ∧ Z2|xM) = 0 (B1)
4We set U, V, and g in [30, Lemma 3.1] to Kˆ, (F,Zn
i
,Ui), and F
′′ respectively.
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where M is a matrix satisfying 〈M〉 = 〈M 1〉 ∩ 〈M2〉. ✷
PROOF By standard arguments in linear algebra, there exists matrices N1 and N 2 such that〈[
M N i
]〉
= 〈M i〉
dim(〈M〉 ∩ 〈N i〉) = 0
for i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows that there is a bijection between Zi and x [M N i ]. To prove the Lemma, i.e., (B1), it
suffices to show that
I(xN1 ∧ xN2|xM ) = 0.
We will argue the stronger claim that xM , xN1, and xN 2 are mutually independent. Since x is uniformly random
by Definition 1, it suffices to show
dim
(
〈M 〉 ∩ 〈N 1〉
)
= 0 = dim
(
〈
[
M N1
]
〉 ∩ 〈N 2〉
)
.
The first equality implies xM is independent of xN1, while the second equality means that (xM , xN1) is
independent of xN2 as desired. The first equality holds by the construction of N 1. The second equality holds
because, otherwise, some column of N2 is in 〈[M N1 ]〉 but not in 〈M〉, contradicting the fact that
〈
[
M N1
]
〉 ∩ 〈
[
M N2
]
〉 = 〈M1〉 ∩ 〈M 2〉 = 〈M 〉.
This completes the proof of the Lemma. 
A interesting Corollary of the above Lemma is the following equivalence of bivariate Ga´c–Ko¨rner common
information, Shannon mutual information, and Wyner common information.
Corollary B1 For any finite linear source (Z1,Z2), we have
JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2) = I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = JW(Z1 ∧ Z2) (B2)
where JGK and JW denotes the Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information and Wyner common information respectively:
JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2) := JGK(Z{1,2}) = max{H(G) | H(G|Z1) = H(G|Z2) = 0}
JW(Z1 ∧ Z2) := min{I(W ∧ Z1,Z2) | I(Z1 ∧ Z2|W) = 0}.
(B3)
(B4)
Furthermore, the solution to (B3) and (B4) are given by xM in Lemma B1. ✷
PROOF It was shown in [8] that (B2) holds with equalities replaced by ≤ in general for any sources. For the finite
linear source, the reverse inequalities will follow by showing that xM in Lemma B1 is a solution to both (B3)
and (B4) because that implies H(xM ) ≤ JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2) and JW(Z1 ∧ Z2) ≤ H(xM ). xM is a solution to (B3)
because it is a common function of Z1 and Z2. xM is a solution to (B4) by (B1). 
Note that the above Corollary implies Theorem 2 for the case |A| = 2. We now prove Theorem 2 by induction
on |A|. Assume the inductive hypothesis that for any j ∈ A, the m.c.f. of Zi for i ∈ A \ {j}, i.e., the solution to
JGK(ZA\{j}), is given by
Z
′
j := xM
(j) where 〈M (j)〉 =
⋂
i∈A\{j}
〈M i〉.
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It suffices to show that H(G|xM) = 0 as follows, since xM is a common function of Zi for i ∈ A trivially:
0
(a)
=H(G|Zj) +H(G|Z
′
j)
≥ H(G|Zj , xM ) +H(G|Z
′
j , xM)
= H(G,Zj , xM ) +H(G,Z
′
j , xM)−H(Zj , xM)−H(Z
′
j , xM )
(b)
≥H(G,Zj ,Z
′
j, xM) +H(G, xM)−H(xM)−H(Zj |xM)−H(Z
′
j, xM)
(c)
=H(G,Zj ,Z
′
j , xM ) +H(G, xM )−H(xM)−H(xM ,Zj,Z
′
j)
= H(G|Zj ,Z
′
j , xM) +H(G|xM) ≥ H(G|xM ).
(a) uses the fact that G is a common function of Zj and Z
′
j . (b) is because H(Zj |G,Z
′
j , xM) ≤ H(Zj |G, xM).
(c) is by applying Lemma B1 with Z1 and Z2 in the Lemma set to Zj and Z
′
j respectively and noting that
〈M 〉 = 〈M (j)〉 ∩ 〈M j〉. This completes the proof.
We remark that Theorem 2 can be viewed as a partial extension of Corollary B1 to multiterminal finite linear
sources. However, while (B2) with equalities replaced by ≤ continue to hold for the multivariate extensions of the
mutual and common information measures [6, Corollary 6.2], the multivariate Wyner common information
JW(ZV ) := min
{
I(W ∧ ZV )
∣∣∣∣∣ H(ZV |W) =∑
i∈V
H(Zi|W)
}
can be strictly larger the multivariate mutual information
I(ZV ) := max
{
γ ∈ R
∣∣∣∣∣ H(ZV )− γ ≤ ∑
C∈P
[H(ZC)− γ], ∀P ∈ Π(V )
}
,
where Π(V ) denotes the set of partitions of V . A simple example can be constructed using the the characterization
of the Wyner common in [7] for the hypergraphical source model, which is a special case of the finite linear source
model. Nevertheless, similar to the multivariate Ga´c–Ko¨rner common information, the multivariate Wyner common
information can also be explicitly evaluated for finite linear sources using linear algebra.
APPENDIX C
ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF THEOREM 1 FOR THE CASE WITH NO DISCUSSION
In this section, we extend the property [9, Lemma 1.1] of the m.c.f. to the multivariate case, which will lead
to an alternative converse proof of Theorem 1 in the case without private randomization nor public discussion is
allowed, i.e., the case when UV is constant and S = V .
Lemma C1 Let G be the m.c.f. of Zi for i ∈ A with |A| ≥ 2, i.e., the solution to JGK(ZA) in (5). For any ǫ > 0,
there exists δ > 0 independent of n such that
Pr{∃i ∈ A,K 6= φi(Z
n
i )} < δ =⇒ Pr{K 6= θ(G
n)} < ǫ (C1)
for some functions φA and θ. ✷
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The recoverability constraint (2a) without private randomization implies the antecedent of the implication (C1)
for sufficiently large n, and so the consequence of (C1) holds with ǫ going to 0 sufficiently slowly in n, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
Pr{K 6= θ(Gn)} = 0.
By Fano’s inequality, this implies the property (A9), i.e., the randomness of K primarily comes from that of G. As
in the converse proof in Section A-B for the case with untrusted helpers, such property implies the desired upper
bound H(G|ZD) on the secret key rate.
PROOF (PROOF OF LEMMA C1) Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we will prove the Lemma by induction on
|A|. The base case follows from [9, Lemma 1.1].5
To prove (C1) for general A, consider any ǫ > 0 and j ∈ A, and let Z′j be the m.c.f. of ZA\{j}. Assume as an
inductive hypothesis that, for any ǫ′ > 0, there exists δ′ > 0 independent of n with
Pr{∃i ∈ A \ {j},K 6= φi(Z
n
i )} < δ
′ =⇒ Pr{K 6= φ′j(Z
′
j
n
)} < ǫ′ (C2)
for some function φ′j . Now, since G is the m.c.f. of Zj and ZA\{j}, we have again by [9, Lemma 1.1] that there
exists δ′′ > 0 independent of n such that
Pr{K 6= φj(Z
n
j ) or K 6= φ
′
j(Z
′
j
n
)} < δ′′ =⇒ Pr{K 6= θ(Gn)} < ǫ,
which has the same consequence as the desired implication (C1). By the union bound, the antecedent of the above
implication holds if
Pr{K 6= φj(Z
n
j )} ≤ δ
′′/2
Pr{K 6= φ′j(Z
′
j
n
)} ≤ δ′′/2.
(C3)
(C4)
By the inductive hypothesis (C2) with ǫ′ = δ′′/2, (C4) holds if
Pr{∃i ∈ A \ {j},K 6= φi(Z
n
i )} < δ
′ (C5)
for some δ′ > 0 independent of n. Choosing δ = min{δ′, δ′′/2}, which is independent of n, the antecedent of (C1)
implies both (C3) and (C5), which imply the consequence of (C1) as desired. 
We remark that the converse proof in Section A-B is stronger because it applies to the more general case with
public discussion at zero rate. If there is public discussion, the recoverability constraint (2a) may not imply the
antecedent of (C1) while Lemma C1 does not appear to extend to the case with public discussion. In particular,
[9, Lemma 1.1] relies on a property of the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Re´nyi maximal correlation that appears to fail to
incoporate the public discussion.
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